# Does Administrative Burden Create Racialized Policy Feedback? How Losing Access to Public Benefits Impacts Beliefs about Government

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#### **Abstract**

Public trust and civic predisposition are cornerstones of well-functioning democratic societies, and burdensome citizen-state encounters may undermine positive views of government, especially for racially minoritized clientele. Leveraging insights from policy feedback theory, we argue that administrative burden has the potential to undermine trust in government and civic predisposition through two mechanisms: 1) *interpretive effects:* burdensome experiences that induce negative emotional responses and 2) *resource effects:* experiences of losing access to public benefits. In our OLS regression analysis of survey data from applicants for a means-tested public benefit program in the U.S. (n=2,250), we find that clients who lost access to benefits were significantly less likely to trust government, and these findings were driven by racially minoritized clients rather than White clients. Our findings demonstrate that experiences of administrative burden that result in the loss of public benefits may result in racialized policy feedback, by disproportionately reducing trust in government and civic predisposition for racially minoritized clientele.

Key Words: Administrative burden, policy feedback, trust in government, racial equity, survey



A cornerstone of effective public administration is public trust and civic predisposition. Together, the public's trust in government to uphold the public interest and do the right thing (Kim 2010), and citizens' civic predisposition—defined as "attitudes about citizenship, community, and public institutions" (Stoddard 2023, 503)—build the foundation of democratic governance. Every citizen-state encounter has the potential to either enhance or undermine public trust and perceptions of public institutions as fair, responsive or efficient (Osborne et al. 2022). The growing interest in administrative burdens highlights the potential for these citizenstate interactions to negatively impact the public, either by imposing psychological costs such as stress and stigma (Baekgaard et al., 2021; Hattke et al., 2020; Simonse et al., 2022), or by resulting in disentitlement, whereby citizens lose access to benefits they are entitled to (Bell, Christensen, et al. 2023; Bhargava and Manoli 2015; Chudnovsky and Peeters 2020; Döring 2021; Heinrich 2016; Heinrich et al. 2022; Linos, Quan, and Kirkman 2020; Masood and Nisar 2021).

While a large body of literature has been dedicated to examining the consequences of burdensome citizen-state interactions for program take-up and citizens' health and behaviors (Baekgaard, Herd, and Moynihan 2022; Gilad and Assouline 2022; Peeters and Campos 2021; Bell, Christensen, and Jessen Hansen 2022), much less attention has been devoted to the potential for burdens to impact civic predisposition and trust in government (Barnes and Hope 2017; Herd and Moynihan 2018). Indeed, in the systematic review of the administrative burden literature, Halling and Baekgaard (2023) highlight the need for additional research investigating the connection between administrative burdens and broader democratic beliefs and behavior. This systematic review therefore highlights the need for scholars to build a better understanding

of whether, how, and *for whom*, burdensome citizen-state interactions may impact public trust and beliefs about government (Halling and Baekgaard 2023; Moynihan and Soss 2014).

In this article, we combine insights from the administrative burden and policy feedback literature to theoretically explore and empirically assess the relationship between experiences of burden and citizens' trust in government and civic predisposition. We challenge the assumption of many previous studies that policy feedback will be a race-blind process; instead, we build on recent work highlighting the importance of racialized organizations (Ray, Herd, and Moynihan 2022) and racialized policy feedback (Barnes and Hope 2017; Garcia-Rios et al. 2021; Michener 2020) to argue that race/ethnicity will moderate the associations between burdensome encounters and democratic belief systems. To test our predictions regarding experiences of burden, race/ethnicity, and beliefs about government, we leverage a survey of clients who either successfully or unsuccessfully retained access to a public benefit program—the Oklahoma's Promise (OKP) which provides full coverage of tuition and fees at in-state universities for low-income families in the state of Oklahoma.

Our findings demonstrate that respondents who lost access to public benefits were significantly less likely to trust government. Second, in line with our hypotheses, we find that the negative association between losing access to public benefits and citizen trust and civic predisposition was driven by racially minoritized respondents. Finally, we find that while the loss of public benefits was consistently related to our outcomes, the results for experiences of burden were less consistent. This suggests there are important differences in the implications of losing access to public benefits due to administrative burdens (*resource effects*) and just experiencing a higher level of burden in citizen-state interactions (*interpretive effects*) for broader beliefs about government such as citizen trust and belief in civic duties.

In this article, we make two contributions to existing scholarship. First, we build on the administrative burden literature by theoretically integrating insights from the policy feedback framework to explore the multiple mechanisms by which burdensome interactions may impact broader beliefs about government. Second, we expand on the growing consciousness of how race intersects with administrative burdens. By acknowledging and theoretically exploring the racialized nature of citizen state interactions, we highlight how these seemingly neutral interactions may have racialized effects on key beliefs systems that hold up the foundation of effective and equitable governance.

# **Connecting Administrative Burden with Policy Feedback**

For many citizens, interactions with government can be stressful, frustrating, and even disempowering (Barnes 2020; Herd and Moynihan 2018; Soss 1999). Strict bureaucratic rules that impose administrative burdens on citizens often result in disentitlement—whereby citizens lose access to rights and benefits—which can have profound consequences for sustaining and creating inequities (Herd and Moynihan 2020; Barnes 2020; Masood and Nisar 2020; Christensen et al. 2020). Administrative burden has been defined as onerous experiences of policy implementation, which emerge from three types of costs: psychological (i.e., stigma, loss of autonomy, stress), learning (i.e., time spent searching for information on program eligibility and matching to government categories), and compliance costs (i.e., time spent on paperwork, meetings with caseworkers) (Baekgaard et al., 2021; Barnes, 2020; Herd & Moynihan, 2018; Moynihan et al., 2015, 2022). Previous administrative burden literature highlights how bureaucratic practices, rules, and procedures complicate and hinder access to service and benefits for citizens at all administrative levels in policy areas ranging from the fields of education and

welfare to medicine (Herd 2015; Masood & Nisar, 2021; Heinrich 2016; Nisar 2018; Burden et al., 2012; Chudnovsky & Peeters, 2021; Heinrich, 2018; Moynihan, Herd, & Harvey, 2015).

One line of research has examined the political construction of administrative burdens and their implications at both the state and individual level (Aarøe et al. 2021; Baekgaard, Moynihan, and Thomsen 2020; Bell et al., 2021). A second stream of research has examined the impacts of administrative burden on clients, highlighting the important disparities that arise from burdensome encounters (Barnes 2020; Bell and Smith 2021; Bhargava and Manoli 2015; Chudnovsky and Peeters 2020; Fox, Stazyk, and Feng 2020; Heinrich 2016; Lopoo, Heflin, and Boskovski 2020; Masood and Nisar 2021; Pepin, O'Leary, and Oberlee 2021; Sievert, Vogel, and Feeney 2020). Some studies have been dedicated to understanding the role of personal resources (i.e., administrative capital, administrative literacy, scarcity, social capital, health) in shaping the unequal distribution of burdens (Bell, Christensen, et al. 2023; Christensen et al. 2020; Chudnovsky and Peeters 2020; Döring 2021; Masood and Nisar 2021), while others have focused on the organizational causes of disparities in administrative burden (Bell and Smith 2021; Heinrich et al. 2022; Peeters 2019). Finally, there is a growing body of research that examines burden reduction or solutions to administrative burdens, and whether these interventions increase take-up and enhance social equity (Baekgaard et al. 2021; Herd et al. 2013; Linos, Quan, and Kirkman 2020; Linos et al. 2022; Lopoo, Heflin, and Boskovski 2020; D. Moynihan et al. 2022; Bell, Kappes, and Williams Forthcoming). Most of the studies in these research foci take a state-centered perspective, where the administrative state is the key independent variable and citizen outcomes are the dependent variables.

However, there is also a growing emphasis on a more citizen-centered approach, that treats citizens not as passive actors but as agents that can also shape citizen-state interactions

(Bell, Christensen, and Jessen Hansen 2022; Gilad and Assouline 2022; Nielsen, Nielsen, and Bisgaard 2020; Nisar 2018; Peeters and Campos 2021). While this body of work has examined the behaviors that citizens may engage in to negotiate for better treatment in burdensome encounters, what remains understudied is the potential for experiences of administrative burdens to shape how citizens see government more broadly. Indeed, while Herd & Moynihan, (2018) present theoretical expectations that experiences of burden may impact broader views about government—such as trust in government and civic predisposition—there has been little empirical or theoretical exploration of this question in the public administration literature (Halling and Baekgaard 2023). Investigating trust in government and broader beliefs about government is critically important as these beliefs may be a key barrier to the effectiveness of burden reduction efforts—that is, for behaviorally informed communications interventions to effectively reduce burdens and increase take-up, there may need to be a solid foundation of citizen trust (de Ridder, Kroese, and van Gestel 2021; Linos et al. 2022; Linos, Reddy, and Rothstein 2022). In the next section, we integrate insights from policy feedback theory to theoretically explore how different experiences of administrative burdens may be linked to the citizens' trust and civic predisposition.

Policy Feedback Effects on Mass Publics: How Policy "Makes" Citizens

Scholars in political science have investigated the role of policy design on civic predisposition and political participation of beneficiaries in public programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Social Security, and the GI Bill (Campbell 2003; Herd and Moynihan 2018; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005; Soss 1999; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Soss and Schram 2007). For decades, political scientists have investigated how policy can create politics, by leaving imprints that

"make" citizens by contributing to political learning (Pierson 1993). In a seminal study, Soss (1999) demonstrates how policy design has different behavioral consequences for the political engagement of beneficiaries—in the more paternalistic AFDC program, participants were less engaged relative to SSI, which has lower burdens on participants and gives individuals the responsibility to reach out to government. One of the theoretical mechanisms at play in this study is conceptualized as an *interpretive effect*, whereby policy designs send messages to citizens about group deservingness and civic standing, which shape the likelihood of future engagement in politics (Soss and Schram 2007). Other studies have focused on resource effects—like the educational attainment gains and civic capacity created with the adoption of the GI Bill for veterans (Mettler 2007). Because veterans experienced the tangible resource effects of less expensive higher education and were exposed to courses on citizenship throughout college after the GI Bill, they were more likely to become politically engaged, particularly if a policymaker was trying to change or eliminate the benefits provided in the GI Bill. Together, this literature has demonstrated that *policy designs* carry both interpretive and resource effects that can either promote or hinder the likelihood of political engagement (Hacker 2004; Pierson 1993; Soss and Schram 2007).

What remains an open question is whether experiences of administrative burden in citizen-state interactions—a specific feature of *policy implementation* that has been largely excluded from policy feedback studies—results in changing public perceptions of government (Moynihan & Soss, 2014). Public administration literature has proven time and time again, even within recent administrative burden studies, that the same policy design may be implemented differently by bureaucrats on the front-lines of implementation who use their discretion to either alleviate or exacerbate administrative burdens in policy design (Barnes and Henly 2018; Bell et

al. 2020; Bell and Smith 2021; Bruch and Soss 2018; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Watkins-Hayes 2009).

Going beyond policy design, we predict that experiences of policy implementation will also have distinct *interpretive* and *resource effects* that result in political learning. On one hand, administrative burden studies demonstrate that onerous experiences of implementation result in negative emotional responses such as stress, stigma, and even shame (Baekgaard et al. 2021; Baekgaard, Herd, and Moynihan 2022; Hattke, Hensel, and Kalucza 2020; Simonse et al. 2022). Building on these existing works, we characterize these reactions to policy implementation as interpretive effects, whereby the public is cognitively impacted by the policies being implemented (Pierson 1993). For instance, more onerous experiences of administrative burden in policy implementation may produce negative political learning effects by conveying messages that beneficiaries are "undeserving" if they are unable to overcome bureaucratic hurdles (Baekgaard, Herd, and Moynihan 2022; Bell et al. 2020; Herd and Moynihan 2018). On the other hand, administrative burdens and the unequal distribution of resources for overcoming burdens (Bell and Smith 2021; Heinrich et al. 2022) may result in resource effects, where the public loses access to key benefits that may help them access education, healthcare, or meet basic needs like housing and food security (Bhargava & Manoli, 2015; Masood & Nisar, 2021; Nisar, 2017; Nisar, 2018; Pepin et al., 2021).

In turn, we argue that these interpretive and resource effects may impact the public's level of trust in government (Kim 2010; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Hansen 2023). Public administration literature has articulated the links between (perceived) performance of government, unfavorable administrative decisions, and the public's trust in government (Yang and Holzer 2006; Zhao and Hu 2017; Berg and Johansson 2020; Hansen 2022). A single

negative experience with government can make individuals view government in a negative light (Dupuy & Defacqz, 2022; Headley, Wright and Meier, 2020; Keiser & Miller, 2020; Nesbit & Reingold, 2011). For instance, those who experienced overcrowded community meetings or inconsistent justifications for public school closure harbor resentment that leads to distrust toward government (Nuamah 2021a; 2021b).

Such frustrations, especially when citizens experience unnecessary administrative burden, can also reinforce notions of belonginess and marginalization (Bell et al., 2021; Moynihan & Soss, 2014; Soss et al., 2011). When citizens do not feel valued, their willingness to participate in civic duties may be diminished. Research documents that citizens feel valued, they are also more likely to engage in traditional avenues of citizen participation (Lebrument et al., 2021). Furthermore, receiving government benefits indicates that citizens are members of a state or jurisdiction where they are endowed certain civic rights and resources. Thus, losing access to government benefits may be perceived as a loss of a social membership or rights, which may prevent economically disadvantaged students from attaining the benefits of higher education (Michener, SoRelle, and Thurston 2022). Because public education has been recognized as a key venue of political learning (Bruch and Soss 2018), losing chances to experience higher education due to losing access to public assistance can also negatively impact civic predisposition. Together, in the context of a burdensome public benefit program, we predict that there will be both interpretive effects as well as resource effects that may undermine trust in government and civic predisposition. By capturing whether respondents have lost access to the public benefit program, we can measure the tangible loss of resources (which may also result in negative interpretive effects), and by incorporating the evaluation of burdens in the application process (including psychological burdens), we can also capture interpretive effects resulting from

experiences of burden in the application process. Together, this allows us to test two separate pathways by which negative experiences with government may impact trust and civic predisposition.

Hypothesis 1a (interpretive effects): individuals who experience higher levels of administrative burden will have lower levels of trust in government and a more negative civic predisposition.

Hypothesis 1b (resource effects): individuals who lose access to benefits will have lower levels of trust in government and a more negative civic predisposition.

## **Racialized Burdens and Feedback Effects**

Where our work breaks new theoretical ground is in our consideration of these citizenstate encounters of administrative burden as inherently racialized, which can perpetuate racial inequities by disproportionately undermining democratic beliefs among racialized groups. As we visualize in Figure 1, we predict that racialized burdens may result in racialized policy feedback (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). While administrative burdens and policy feedback scholarship originated as race-blind frameworks for understanding the broader impacts of burdensome policy designs and citizen-state interactions, recent scholarship calls for more attention to the ways in which race/ethnicity may structure citizen-state interactions (Berry-James et al. 2020; Blessett et al. 2019; Michener 2019; Wright and Merritt 2020). Michener (2019) suggests the importance of race in policy feedback studies when racial inequality exists in the amount of benefits and burdens, and in the number of populations of beneficiary and beneficiary. These recent developments advance theoretical development by recognizing the ways in which racism and White supremacy have been deeply embedded within the current institutions shaping policy design and implementation, which has profound impacts on the distribution of burden as well as the impacts of burden on racially minoritized communities

(Blessett and Gaynor 2021; Einstein and Glick 2017). We use these studies as a starting point for better characterizing *for whom* administrative burden and policy feedback may be most impactful.




Figure 1. Theoretical Model for Key Hypotheses

Recent scholarship makes it clear that public organizations are not value-neural entities; embedded within many public organizations are racialized routines in formal or informal institutions such as bureaucratic rules, norms or organizational cultures that shape individual behaviors and define the rules of the game (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The collective identity of racialized organizations at the mesolevel constrains bureaucrats' behaviors in a way that impose disproportionate administrative burden on racial subgroups (Ray, Herd, and Moynihan 2022). This disproportionate use of discretion to deny access to racially minoritized clients has been found in a number of diverse policy areas (e.g., Andersen & Guul, 2019; Assouline et al., 2021; Jilke et al., 2018). Two prominent policy areas where research has revealed these disparities are welfare and work programs. When studying how policies are implemented client's race is linked to caseworkers' decisions that disproportionately discriminatory towards people of color (Goldrick-Rab and

Shaw 2005; Gooden 2003; Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002). For instance, in a national study of 1996 Welfare Reform and the 1998 Workforce Investment Act, Goldrick-Rab and Shaw (2005) found that caseworkers reduced who could receive opportunities for college enrollment by focusing on rapid job placement instead. This reduction in college enrollment was driven by the reduction in access to college for both African Americans and Latinos. Issues of discrimination based upon race has also been shown in other studies that examined welfare reform (Fording et al. 2007; Schram, Fording, and Soss 2008; Soss et al. 2008). These citizen state interactions are racialized to the point that they not only affect outcomes but also the way information is disseminated. In a study of Washington State Community Service Officers Ernst, Nguyen and Taylor (2013) found that the information given the clients by representatives of the state was moderated by the citizens race. Race plays a critical role in either encouraging increased citizenstate interactions or increasing burdens for citizens. Citizen's race is an important factor for understanding their views and perceptions of government (Tolbert, C. J., & Mossberger, 2006, Wright et al., 2022; Yang 2006) but also how the state views the citizen.

These behavioral and attitudinal effects of policy feedback may differ across racial or ethnic groups (Michener 2019). Because of racial disparities in policy implementation, racially minoritized groups are more cognizant of the type of interactions they have with civil servants (Garcia-Rios et al. 2021; Nuamah and Ogorzalek 2021). Due to historical systemic institutional racism that has plagued the U.S (Michener 2019; Koch 2019), when racialized minority groups experience burden or mistreatment by state actors it also produces other detrimental effects. A recent study by Wright et al., (2023) found that when Black individuals experience negative encounters with the police it also reduces Black individuals trust in government. Negative experiences with government and losing access to government benefits may lead to racialized

groups feeling frustrated and excluded which in turn leads to disengagement in the full political process (Van Ryzin, 2015). Taken together, this body of evidence suggests that people of color are disproportionately negatively impacted by burdens which may also reduce their faith and trust in government to be responsive to their needs (Wright et al., 2023). As a result, we predict that when there are racialized administrative burdens and certain racial and ethnic groups are negatively impacted by changes to policy implementation, like DACA students who are predominantly Hispanic in our case described below, they will react by having more negative views of government.

Hypothesis 2: We predict that people of color will be disproportionately negatively impacted by experiences of burden and the loss of public benefits, resulting in significantly lower levels of trust in government and a more negative civic predisposition.

# Research Design

To test our hypotheses, we partnered with the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to distribute a state-wide survey to current and former applicants of the Oklahoma's Promise program (OKP)—the state tuition-free college program for families making less than \$50,000 a year. We chose this case for two main reasons. First, the encounter with the state for this program occurs in 8th, 9th, or 10th grade, making this one of the first times that students interact with government, and access to financial aid can be transformational in the lives of low-income students (Bettinger et al., 2019). <sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> However, for parents this is likely not the first citizen-state encounter. Moreover, since we are reaching out to applicants that may have applied in prior years, they may also have experienced other encounters with government since first applying for the program. Due to only capturing applicants, we also cannot capture those students who never applied because the application was too onerous.

Second, students and parents face considerable difficulty complying with the stringent set of eligibility requirements—in fact only around one third of the income eligible students overcome the administrative hurdles needed to access the Oklahoma's Promise program (Bell et al., 2020). After students submit an application in 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, or 10<sup>th</sup> grade, they are considered "enrolled" in the program—our sample only includes the students who enrolled in the program due to legal constraints on contacting a broader set of students. After they enroll in middle or high school, students must be certified as compliant with the program requirements by their high school counselor upon high school graduation. This certification process involves checking whether students meet the many programmatic requirements—including filling out the FAFSA, completing a 17-unit core curriculum, proving documentation of citizenship, maintaining compliant with conduct requirements banning criminal and delinquent acts, and meeting GPA requirements in the core curriculum. Prior research has found that counselors vary substantially in how they engage in this verification process, with some seeing their role as restricting program access and others attempting to help students as much as possible in their effort to get the scholarship (Bell et al. 2020; Bell and Smith 2021). Even if students are certified as compliant upon high school graduation, there is still another chance for them to be denied access while they are in college, as there are annual income checks requiring the submission of parental tax returns before students can be renewed for another year of funding by the state agency. Therefore, this case provides an ideal context in which to examine how experiences of burden and the loss of access to a public benefit program impacts trust and civic predisposition.

The administration of this program may appear race-blind, but the state legislature adopted an explicitly racialized burden with the addition of the citizenship requirement in 2007 with the passage of HB 1804. On the debate floor state legislators explicitly said this provision

was to remove any undocumented students from accessing the program, which resulted in the systematic removal of DACA students from eligibility (these students are predominantly of Hispanic/Latino origin) (Koralek, Pedroza, and Capps 2009). These changes caused a culture of fear among the Hispanic community in Oklahoma. For instance, "when asked if they knew any Hispanic students who had to give up on college, a student related this story: "I know at least one - she went back to Mexico - she didn't want to get into trouble. She is trying to go to school there. That was the only way she could go to school. We're talking about a kid that had good grades – Oklahoma was supposed to benefit from having her here, contributing" (Advancement of Hispanic Students in Higher Education Task Force 2009, 27). This change in policy design sent a clear message to immigrant communities in Oklahoma that they were "undeserving" of the benefits provided in the Oklahoma's Promise, resulting in an explicitly racialized policy implementation process that targeted and sanctioned students from racialized groups more than White students who were born in the U.S. Therefore, any theoretical framework that did not consider the role of race/ethnicity in experiences of burden and policy feedback, which has been the status quo in much of the literature, would miss the ways in which these racialized burdens may create racialized policy feedback effects among students targeted by changes to policy implementation.

In the survey, we measured students' experiences of burden applying for the program, whether they lost access, and we asked about their civic predisposition and trust in government. We summarize the measurement and reliability scores for our independent, dependent, and control variables in Appendix A.

For the administrative burden measure, we leverage the scale developed by de Bruijn (2021), which includes questions for learning costs (item 4), compliance costs (items 1 and 7),

and psychological costs (items 2, 3, and 5) (Moynihan et al., 2015). There is also one item that does not refer to any of the specific types of burden and instead captures citizen satisfaction with the programmatic requirements. In the analysis, we combine all items into one administrative burden index ranging from 0-1 (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.86$ ). The other key independent variable captures whether the student ever lost access to the scholarship program, which could be due to a number of reasons including simply not meeting requirements, or due to an experience of bureaucratic disentitlement in which a counselor responsible for certifying compliance erroneously denied them access (Bell et al. 2020; Bell and Smith 2021). We treat any experience of losing access (regardless of the reason) as a potentially traumatic incident for low-income students in our sample, which could impact our outcomes of interest<sup>3</sup>.

Our dependent variables capture: 1) trust in government, and 2) civic predisposition. For trust in government, we distinguished between different levels of government to ensure that we captured the potentially differential beliefs about the Federal government compared to the State government, which implements the Oklahoma's Promise. Second, we draw from Dalton (2008)'s conceptualization of citizenship norms to measure a variety of beliefs about civic duty (Blais and Achen 2019; Dalton 2008; Goodman 2012; Vermunt 2017). The civic duty measures capture both *mandatory duties* (jury duty and obeying law and regulations) and *voluntary responsibilities* 

<sup>2</sup> We collapse the burden index into a 0-1 scale by adding all the items for each respondent and then subtracting by the number of questions (7) and dividing by 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Students could specify whether they lost access in high school versus college or if they never got to the "enrolled" stage, in the question but we combine all of these categories. To clarify what this situation could look like, you could imagine a situation in which a student misunderstood a program requirement—a common misunderstanding was that the GPA requirement applied to courses within the core curriculum which is hand calculated by counselors and not released to students like the overall GPA unless they calculate this themselves (Bell and Smith 2021). In this case, one could either interpret this as a learning cost in the administrative burden framework, or it could simply be that the counselor mistakenly miscalculated the GPA which may be framed as bureaucratic disentitlement. Regardless of the reason, we are capturing the loss of access, without regard to the specific reason why which we cannot theoretically distinguish in our data.

(voting, serving in the military, volunteering for charities). Together, these outcomes measure broader views about government that could shape the likelihood of engaging with public managers as well as a number of other avenues of political engagement.

#### Sample and Data Description

The Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education program staff sent the survey to a list-serv of former applicants for Oklahoma's Promise scholarship.<sup>4</sup> Due to legal restrictions on the state agency's use of contact information, we were only able to reach out to applicants that had initially successfully enrolled in the program (in 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, or 10<sup>th</sup> grade).<sup>5</sup> We got a response rate of approximately 8-10%, with a total of 2,750 students or parents completing the survey (though 4,273 started the survey, many dropped off before completing). Once we account for missing data, we have an analytical sample of approximately 2,200 respondents (1,281 parents and 969 students). Most importantly, nearly half of our sample is from a racially minoritized background, which allows us to have sufficient statistical power to examine the ways in which race structures experiences of administrative burden. We summarize our analytical dataset in Table 1.

Compared to the state population<sup>6</sup>, our sample is significantly lower income and includes substantially more racial diversity. As a means-tested program, Oklahoma's Promise draws applicants that are disproportionately socioeconomically disadvantaged and racially minoritized, which provides a theoretical sample of individuals who are likely to need help from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The agency estimates that there were approximately 29,000 potentially valid email addresses but also noted that this is an overestimate given how old some of the email addresses were. They estimated that there were at least 5-7,000 bounced emails that never made it to applicants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This is an important limitation, as we cannot capture experiences of students and families that experienced initial denial of eligibility. Instead, we are able to measure the effects of losing eligibility after previously being deemed eligible for the program.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, we are unable to acquire data that captures the demographic information for the theoretical population (all applicants for Oklahoma's Promise).

government and also face disproportionate burdens in applying for means-tested programs (Christensen et al. 2020; Ray, Herd, and Moynihan 2022). Therefore, while we caution against interpreting our sample as a representative sample of the broader population in the state, we also note the strength of our sample in effectively representing the clients that are income eligible for means-tested public benefits.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

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Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Experiences of Burden/					_
Loss of Access					
System Burden	2,218	0.28	0.22	0	1
Lost Access <sup>7</sup>	2,222	0.11	0.31	0	1
Beliefs about Civic Duty					
Civic Predisposition Index	2,014	7.64	1.61	0	10
Vote in Elections	2,184	8.54	2.17	0	10
Active in Voluntary Orgs	2,154	7.81	2.42	0	10
Serve on Jury	2,114	7.20	2.26	0	10
Obey Laws and Regulations	2,191	8.99	1.64	0	10
Serve in military	2,055	5.59	3.04	0	10
Trust in Government					
Trust in State government	2,222	3.04	1.17	1	5
Trust in Federal government	2,222	2.96	1.18	1	5
Control Variables					
White	2,222	0.53	0.50	0	1
Black	2,222	0.10	0.30	0	1
Hispanic	2,222	0.10	0.30	0	1
Native American	2,222	0.09	0.29	0	1
Asian	2,222	0.06	0.24	0	1
Multiple Races	2,222	0.11	0.32	0	1
Gender Identity (Woman)	2,222	0.80	0.40	0	1
Family Income	2,222	1.80	1.10	1	6
Education	2,222	4.50	1.63	1	8
Parent Education	2,222	4.38	1.91	1	8
Childhood Scarcity Index	2,222	0.25	0.33	0	1
Administrative Literacy	2,222	25.42	5.26	7	35
Social Capital	2,343	4.37	1.91	1	8

Empirical Approach

<sup>7</sup> The number of non-White respondents who lost access is 103 and the number of White respondents who lost access is 145. 49 respondents who lost access did not indicate their race/ethnicity.

For our formal analysis, we implement a standard OLS regression with heteroskedastic robust standard errors predicting our dependent variables (trust in government and civic predisposition), as a function of 1) the experience of administrative burden index (*interpretive* effects), and 2) whether the respondent lost access to Oklahoma's Promise (resource effects). We include high school fixed effects to address school and community level confounding variables and ensure that we are comparing students who had similar resources in their high school (Bell and Smith 2021). We control for standard demographic factors (race/ethnicity, gender, income, education, parent education) as well as a host of other control variables that help us to isolate the associations between experiences of burden and our outcome variables. We incorporate parent education and experiences of childhood scarcity and scarcity while in high school (Mittal, Laran, and Griskevicius 2020) because these factors shape the level of knowledge about college financial aid processes and the resources available to students when applying for the Oklahoma's Promise program. Additionally, we also control for social capital and administrative literacy, as these factors have been highlighted in prior studies on experiences of administrative burden (Christensen et al., 2020; Döring, 2021; Heinrich et al., Forthcoming; Masood & Nisar, 2021). To test the robustness of the results, we also include a specification where we include both lost access and experiences of burden in the same regression model in Appendix Table C1. This alternative specification does not change the main findings, which increases confidence in the consistency of our estimates.

#### **Results**

We present our findings testing Hypothesis 1b in Table 2 and Hypothesis 1a in Table 3. The results in Table 2 provide support for Hypothesis 1b—individuals who lost access to Oklahoma's Promise program were less likely to trust the state (Est = -0.127, SE = 0.062, p =

0.041) and federal government (Est = -0.112, SE = 0.065, p = 0.088). To provide a better understanding of magnitude and test the robustness of the results to alternative specifications, we rerun the models where the dependent variables are dichotomous<sup>8</sup>. These estimates, presented in Appendix Table C2, demonstrate that losing access to OKP is associated with a 9.6 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that respondents reported above average levels of trust in the state government and a 7.4 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that respondents reported above average levels of trust in the federal government. Therefore, losing access to Oklahoma's Promise appears to have a substantively meaningful association with the likelihood that respondents trust the government to do the right thing.

In contrast to the results on trust in government, the average civic predisposition of respondents was not significantly different across those that lost access to Oklahoma's Promise and those that did not experience a loss of access, when we do not account for the influence of race/ethnicity.

In Table 3, we test Hypothesis 1a—whether the experienced level of administrative burden in the application process is related to civic predisposition and trust in government. We find that the associations between experiences of burden and civic predisposition and trust in government are all insignificant. Therefore, while we find support for Hypothesis 1b—which reflects a more extreme experience of administrative burden that results in the tangible loss of resources—we do not find support for the notion that experiences of burden (i.e., interpretive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For trust in government, we measure the outcome as 1=neutral/somewhat/strongly agree that the state/federal government can be trusted to do the right thing, 0=somewhat/strongly disagree. For civic predisposition, we collapse the scale into an above average and below average dichotomous measure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> When we examine the individual civic duty measures rather than the index, we do find that respondents who lost access were less likely to believe in the importance of obeying laws and regulations. These results are available upon request.

effects) are linked to broader beliefs about government. Together, these findings suggest that interpretive effects resulting from experiences of burden are less predictive of beliefs about government than the tangible loss of resources.

**Table 2.** Associations Between Losing Access to OKP and Trust in Government and Civic Predisposition

Predisposition	Civic Duty	Trust in state government	Trust in Federal government
Lost Access	-0.0866	-0.127**	-0.112*
SE	(0.127)	(0.062)	(0.065)
P-value	0.495	0.041	0.088
Control Variables	0.175	0.011	0.000
Gender Identity (Woman)	0.166**	0.0555	0.106**
SE	(0.080)	(0.053)	(0.048)
P-value	0.040	0.292	0.029
Family Income	0.173***	-0.0973***	-0.0811***
SE	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.022)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Black	-0.310**	0.00675	0.132*
SE	(0.142)	(0.071)	(0.073)
P-value	0.030	0.925	0.071
Hispanic	-0.0221	0.214***	0.246***
SE	(0.158)	(0.061)	(0.071)
P-value	0.888	0.001	0.001
Native American	-0.201	0.0463	0.144*
SE	(0.171)	(0.074)	(0.087)
P-value	0.241	0.530	0.097
Asian	-0.0295	0.368***	0.430***
SE	(0.144)	(0.089)	(0.094)
P-value	0.838	0.000	0.000
Multiple Races	-0.176	0.0548	0.0912
SE	(0.140)	(0.066)	(0.067)
P-value	0.209	0.403	0.177
Education	-0.111***	-0.113***	-0.113***
SE	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.017)
P-value	0.001	0.000	0.000
Parent Education	0.0795***	0.00212	-0.00112
SE	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.016)
P-value	0.007	0.888	0.943
Social Capital	0.464***	0.316***	0.214**
SE	(0.149)	(0.080)	(0.092)
P-value	0.002	0.000	0.020
Childhood Scarcity	0.265**	-0.0855	-0.046
SE	(0.122)	(0.066)	(0.066)
P-value	0.0313	0.195	0.485

Administrative Literacy	0.0717***	0.144***	0.140***
SE	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Scarcity in High School	0.0187	-0.0144	-0.0235
SE	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.017)
P-value	0.565	0.401	0.168
Constant	5.167***	-0.229*	-0.230*
SE	(0.242)	(0.118)	(0.121)
P-value	0.000	0.054	0.059
High school fixed effects	X	X	X
Observations	1,898	2,170	2,170
R-squared	0.237	0.548	0.534

Robust standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 3.** Associations Between Experiences of Burden and Trust in Government and Civic Predisposition

	Civic Duty	Trust in state government	Trust in Federal government
	W.O.		
Experience of Burden	0.184	-0.152	-0.003
SE	(0.208)	(0.100)	(0.112)
P-value	0.378	0.130	0.981
Control Variables			
Gender Identity (Woman)	0.165**	0.0469	0.099**
SE	(0.080)	(0.053)	(0.048)
P-value	0.041	0.379	0.039
Family Income	0.164***	-0.101***	-0.085***
SE	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.023)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Black	-0.308**	0.0134	0.128*
SE	(0.142)	(0.071)	(0.072)
P-value	0.031	0.851	0.075
Hispanic	-0.0134	0.223***	0.253***
SE	(0.158)	(0.061)	(0.071)
P-value	0.933	0.000	0.000
Native American	-0.203	0.0558	0.151*
SE	(0.171)	(0.074)	(0.086)
P-value	0.237	0.451	0.082
Asian	-0.0212	0.376***	0.437***
SE	(0.142)	(0.089)	(0.094)
P-value	0.882	0.000	0.000
Multiple Races	-0.18	0.0563	0.0893
SE	(0.139)	(0.066)	(0.068)
P-value	0.195	0.396	0.189
Education	-0.109***	-0.114***	-0.114***
SE	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.017)

P-value	0.001	0.000	0.000
Parent Education	0.0793***	0.003	-0.000794
SE	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.016)
P-value	0.007	0.846	0.960
Social Capital	0.525***	0.302***	0.229***
SE	(0.156)	(0.080)	(0.087)
P-value	0.001	0.000	0.009
Childhood Scarcity	0.266**	-0.0843	-0.0461
SE	(0.123)	(0.066)	(0.066)
P-value	0.0311	0.203	0.483
Administrative Literacy	0.0744***	0.143***	0.141***
SE	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Scarcity in High School	0.0197	-0.0121	-0.0218
SE	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.017)
P-value	0.559	0.472	0.202
Constant	5.000***	-0.145	-0.245*
SE	(0.310)	(0.144)	(0.143)
P-value	0.000	0.316	0.089
High school fixed effects	X	X	X
Observations	1,893	2,164	2,164
R-squared	0.238	0.548	0.533

Robust standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Does Race/Ethnicity Moderate the Association Between Burdens and Beliefs about Government?

In Table 4, we present the analysis where we interact the experience of lost access with race/ethnicity (using White vs. non-White as a starting point prior to delving into race/ethnicity specific associations). Our analysis by race provides support for Hypothesis 2—the negative association between losing access to Oklahoma's Promise and trust in the state government is driven by non-White applicants. Moreover, for non-White applicants who lose access, civic predisposition is significantly diminished, which is not the case for White applicants who lost access. In Figure 2, we plot the marginal effects of losing access to Oklahoma's Promise for White respondents and non-White Respondents for both civic predisposition and trust in the state government. This figure makes it clear that losing access to Oklahoma's Promise is associated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> We recognize that this is reductionist, and we therefore choose to also break the results down by individual racial and ethnic identities to provide additional nuance.

with a significant drop in non-White respondents trust in the state government, while the slope for White respondents is flat, indicating that losing access is not associated with significant changes in trust for White respondents. When we utilize a dichotomous outcome measure to better understand the substantive size of the associations (see Appendix Table C3), we find that losing access to Oklahoma's Promise is associated with a 19-percentage point decrease in the likelihood of trusting the state government for non-White respondents, compared to a statistically insignificant 4 percentage point decrease for White respondents.

For civic predisposition, losing access to Oklahoma's Promise for non-White respondents is associated with respondents moving from average civic predisposition (7.59/10) to just below the average for civic predisposition (7.15/10), which is statistically insignificant in Appendix Table C3 when we collapse the dependent variable into a dichotomous measure capturing above and below average civic predisposition. Nevertheless, regardless of the small magnitude, it does appear that the association between losing access to Oklahoma's Promise and civic predisposition is divergent across the racial groups, with White respondents remaining unaffected by losses of access to Oklahoma's Promise. Together, this analysis reveals that the relationship between losing access and both civic predisposition and trust in the state government depends on the respondent's racial/ethnic identity.

When we examine the interaction between losing access and specific racial/ethnic groups in comparison to White respondents,<sup>11</sup> we find two main takeaways. First, Asian and Hispanic respondents are driving the negative association between losing access and trust in the state government. Second, Hispanic respondents and Black respondents who lost access had significantly diminished civic predisposition compared to White respondents who lost access.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> These results are available upon request.


The fact that Hispanic respondents are driving these results aligns with the racialized implementation of the Oklahoma's Promise program—the citizenship requirement passed by the state legislature in 2007 was specifically put in place to prevent undocumented students and DACA students (the majority of whom are Hispanic in Oklahoma) from accessing the program. These results reveal the importance of examining specific racial/ethnic identities as moderators between the experience of losing access to public benefits and trust in government and civic predisposition.

**Table 4.** Associations Between Losing Access to OKP and Trust in Government and Civic Predisposition, by Race

	Civic Duty	Trust in state government	Trust in Federal government
Lost Access	0.168	-0.0262	-0.0897
SE	(0.165)	(0.084)	(0.086)
P-value	0.308	0.756	0.297
Non-White	-0.0954	0.140***	0.192***
SE	(0.088)	(0.045)	(0.046)
P-value	0.276	0.002	0.000
Lost Access*Non-White	-0.612**	-0.254**	-0.0746
SE	(0.251)	(0.129)	(0.131)
P-value	0.015	0.049	0.570
Control Variables			
Gender Identity (Woman)	0.160*	0.0417	0.0943*
SE	(0.095)	(0.049)	(0.050)
P-value	0.090	0.395	0.059
Family Income	0.169***	-0.101***	-0.0835***
SE	(0.040)	(0.020)	(0.021)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education	-0.104***	-0.110***	-0.112***
SE	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.016)
P-value	0.001	0.000	0.000
Parent Education	0.0689***	-0.0065	-0.00743
SE	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.014)
P-value	0.008	0.629	0.588
Social Capital	0.440***	0.301***	0.202**
SE	(0.159)	(0.081)	(0.082)
P-value	0.006	0.000	0.014
Childhood Scarcity	0.258**	-0.0882	-0.0517
SE	(0.129)	(0.067)	(0.068)
P-value	0.0452	0.187	0.448

Administrative Literacy	0.0723***	0.145***	0.141***
SE	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000
Scarcity in High School	0.013	-0.0171	-0.0243
SE	(0.035)	(0.018)	(0.019)
P-value	0.713	0.352	0.195
Constant	5.415***	-0.258*	-0.265*
SE	(0.285)	(0.146)	(0.149)
P-value	0.000	0.078	0.075
High school fixed effects	X	X	X
Observations	1,981	2,250	2,250
R-squared	0.265	0.559	0.547

Robust standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Figure 2.** Marginal Effects Plots for the Interaction Between Losing Access and Race/Ethnicity on Trust in Government and Civic Predisposition

**Table 5.** Associations Between Experiences of Burden and Trust in Government and Civic Predisposition, by Race

Experience of Burden   0.388	Tredisposition, by Nace	Civic Duty	Trust in state government	Trust in Federal government
SE	Experience of Burden	0.388	-0.194	-0.013
P-value         0.123         0.133         0.922           Non-White         -0.0276         0.102         0.186***           SE         (0.127)         (0.065)         (0.067)           P-value         0.828         0.118         0.005           Experience of Burden*Non-White         -0.472         0.0685         0.001           SE         (0.348)         (0.180)         (0.183)           P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables         0.095         (0.049)         (0.050)           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Sc <td< td=""><td>=</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>	=			
Non-White         -0.0276         0.102         0.186***           SE         (0.127)         (0.065)         (0.067)           P-value         0.828         0.118         0.005           Experience of Burden*Non-White         4.472         0.0685         0.001           SE         (0.348)         (0.180)         (0.183)           P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables         V         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104**         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.166****         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.001         0.004         0.001           SE         (0.026)         (0.014)         (0.014)           P-value <td< td=""><td></td><td>, ,</td><td>` '</td><td>` '</td></td<>		, ,	` '	` '
SE         (0.127)         (0.065)         (0.067)           P-value         0.828         0.118         0.005           Experience of Burden*Non-White         0.472         0.0685         0.001           SE         (0.348)         (0.180)         (0.183)           P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables           Gender Identity (Woman)         0.159*         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           P-value         0.004         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         0.014         (0.014)           P-value         0.007         0.014         (0.014)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.084				
P-value         0.828         0.118         0.005           Experience of Burden*Non-White         -0.472         0.0685         0.001           SE         (0.348)         (0.180)         (0.183)           P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables           Gender Identity (Woman)         0.159*         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Se         (0.163)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.084				
Experience of Burden*Non-White         -0.472         0.0685         0.001           SE         (0.348)         (0.180)         (0.183)           P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables           Gender Identity (Woman)         0.159*         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           Parent Education         0.0697***         -0.00494         -0.00725           SE         (0.026)         (0.014)         (0.014)           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Social Capital         0.508***         0.290****         0.217****           SE         (0.163) <td></td> <td>, ,</td> <td></td> <td>` ,</td>		, ,		` ,
SE         (0.348)         (0.180)         (0.183)           P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables         0.095         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Social Capital         0.508***         0.290***         0.217***           SE         (0.163)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.0847         -0.0517           SE         (0.129)         (0.067)         (0.068)           P-value	Experience of Burden*Non-White			
P-value         0.175         0.704         0.993           Control Variables         0.0321         0.0878*           Gender Identity (Woman)         0.159*         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Social Capital         0.508***         0.290***         0.217***           SE         (0.163)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.0847         -0.0517           SE         (0.129)         (0.067)         (0.068)           P-value         <	•			
Control Variables         Gender Identity (Woman)         0.159*         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Social Capital         0.508***         0.290***         0.217***           SE         (0.163)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.0847         -0.0517           SE         (0.129)         (0.067)         (0.068)           P-value         0.046         0.207         0.449 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>· ·</td>				· ·
Gender Identity (Woman)         0.159*         0.0321         0.0878*           SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           SE         (0.026)         (0.014)         (0.014)           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Social Capital         0.508***         0.290***         0.217***           SE         (0.163)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.00         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.0847         -0.0517           SE         (0.129)         (0.067)         (0.068)           P-value	Control Variables			
SE         (0.095)         (0.049)         (0.050)           P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106***         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           P-value         0.007         -0.014         -0.00725           SE         (0.026)         (0.014)         -0.00725           SE         (0.033)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.011           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.0847         -0.0517           SE         (0.024)		0.159*	0.0321	0.0878*
P-value         0.094         0.513         0.079           Family Income         0.162***         -0.104***         -0.0880***           SE         (0.040)         (0.020)         (0.021)           P-value         0.000         0.000         0.000           Education         -0.106****         -0.113***         -0.113***           SE         (0.031)         (0.016)         (0.016)           P-value         0.001         0.000         0.000           Parent Education         0.0697****         -0.00494         -0.00725           SE         (0.026)         (0.014)         (0.014)           P-value         0.007         0.714         0.598           Social Capital         0.508***         0.290***         0.217****           SE         (0.163)         (0.083)         (0.084)           P-value         0.002         0.000         0.010           Childhood Scarcity         0.258**         -0.0847         -0.0517           SE         (0.129)         (0.067)         (0.068)           P-value         0.046         0.207         0.449           Administrative Literacy         0.0744***         0.143***         0.141***      <	• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
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Scarcity in High School       0.0182       -0.0129       -0.0222         SE       (0.036)       (0.019)       (0.019)         P-value       0.609       0.484       0.238         Constant       5.220***       -0.16       -0.273         SE       (0.324)       (0.166)       (0.169)         P-value       0.000       0.334       0.107         High school fixed effects       X       X       X         Observations       1,976       2,244       2,244		, ,	` /	, ,
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P-value       0.609       0.484       0.238         Constant       5.220***       -0.16       -0.273         SE       (0.324)       (0.166)       (0.169)         P-value       0.000       0.334       0.107         High school fixed effects       X       X       X         Observations       1,976       2,244       2,244				
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	e			

Robust standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In contrast to the results in Table 4, we find no significant interactions between race, experiences of burden, and our outcome measures when we utilize the White/non-White dichotomy in Table 5. However, when we look at specific racial/ethnic groups, we find that Native American and Asian respondents experiencing higher levels of burden were significantly less likely to trust the government compared to their White counterparts. Together, these results once again demonstrate the importance of specific racial/ethnic identities in structuring the relationship between experiences of burden and beliefs about government.

#### Limitations

Our descriptive analysis has several limitations that should be factored into the interpretation of the results. First, there is the possibility of reverse causality—for example, a student could have low trust in government when they apply for the program and for that reason, they may not want to provide additional income documentation for fear of the government using that data for nefarious purposes. This is less of a concern because all the students in our sample submitted an application in 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup>, or 10<sup>th</sup> grade which required income documentation, so our sample is likely already a selected set of individuals that were able to overcome this initial barrier and had some level of trust in government. While this sample makes reverse causality less likely and allows us to examine one of the first citizen-state interactions student respondents experience, it also means that our findings may not generalize to respondents who never enrolled in the program in the first place. Second, there is always the possibility of omitted variable bias that could be driving the associations we uncover. However, while this is possible, we believe this is less likely in our study because of the theoretically driven and comprehensive set of control variables we include in the analysis, which reduces the likelihood that some other variable (like social capital) is driving the results. Nevertheless, in the future, scholars should

build on this work by attempting to identify the causal effects of burdens on broader views about government, perhaps in a field experiment context to preserve the ecological validity that would be lost in a survey experiment.

## **Conclusion**

Increasingly, public administration scholars have revealed the negative effects of administrative burden, and racialized burdens, on equity in access to public services (Bell, Kappes, and Williams Forthcoming; Bell, Christensen, et al. 2023; Bell and Meyer 2023; Ray, Herd, and Moynihan 2022; Christensen et al. 2020). However, administrative burden literature has largely ignored the broader implications of burdensome interactions on democratic beliefs and behaviors (Halling and Baekgaard 2023). We build on this work by emphasizing the potential for burdensome interactions with government agencies to undermine trust in government and civic predisposition (e.g., Hansen 2022; Mettler 2011; Moynihan and Soss 2014; Koch 2019; Zhao and Hu 2017; Berg and Johansson 2020). We leverage theoretical insights from policy feedback literature to test the extent to which administrative burdens shape trust in government and civic predisposition among clientele in a means-tested public benefit program. We develop novel hypotheses that connect the administrative burden framework to the distinct theoretical mechanisms in policy feedback theory: resource and interpretive effects. Most importantly, we challenge the assumption of existing literature that feedback effects from burdensome citizen-state interactions will be equally distributed; instead, we build on the recent theoretical advancements on racialized policy feedback and racialized burdens to argue that feedback effects will be particularly pronounced for racially minoritized groups. We argue that the incorporation of race/ethnicity in the theoretical model of policy feedback is essential so that

we understand *for whom* burdensome encounters with government may impact public trust and civic predisposition.

One of the key takeaways from our findings is that resource effects (i.e., the tangible loss of resources in the form of public benefits) may be a more powerful mechanism for inducing changes in beliefs about government than simply experiencing more onerous citizen-state interactions without losing access to public benefits. Our findings demonstrate that when clients lost access to public benefits, they were less likely to trust the state and federal government, but they were no less likely to report a positive civic predisposition. These associations were concentrated among students, for whom the Oklahoma's Promise was likely their first interaction with government, rather than parent respondents (see Appendix B). On the other hand, we find that experiences of burden did not predict the level of trust in government or civic predisposition. Together, this suggests that interpretive effects—whereby clients view the encounter as burdensome and experience psychological costs—may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for impacting broader views about government such as trust and civic predisposition. When combined with resource effects (i.e., the loss of access to public benefits), however, the likelihood that clients trust government and report positive civic predisposition may be significantly impacted. Together these findings contribute to the literature on citizen-state interactions and administrative burdens by demonstrating the implications of bureaucratic disentitlement for public trust and civic predisposition. We encourage future research to further test the generalizability of these findings on the role of interpretive and resource effects in other policy contexts and test the potential for the *first* interaction with government to be particularly impactful on broader beliefs about government.

Our findings also build on the growing consciousness on the ways in which race structures citizen-state interactions by revealing the potential for administrative burdens to create racialized policy feedback (Michener 2020). Recent scholarship by Ray et al., (2022) illustrates how racialized organizations utilize administrative burden as a tool to perpetuate White supremacy at the meso level. Other scholarship has highlighted how administrative burdens are more prevalent in programs that serve marginalized communities (Bell, Schwegman, et al. 2023; Bell, Christensen, et al. 2023), which exacerbates inequality at the meso-level. However, while scholars have highlighted racial inequality in the distribution of burdens across programs at the organizational level, there is a dearth of literature examining the influence of race on experiences of administrative burden within programs at the micro-level. In fact, while these meso-level frameworks integrate race as an essential factor explaining the existence and deleterious effects of administrative burden at the organizational level, micro-level frameworks have taken a more race-blind approach (Chudnovsky and Peeters, 2020; Christensen et al., 2020). This is problematic because our findings demonstrate that the relationship between administrative burdens and beliefs about government were racialized—Racially minoritized clients drove the negative association between the loss of access to public benefits and trust in the state government, and they also experienced a significant drop in civic pre-disposition when compared to White counterparts. In this way, we demonstrate that a race-blind approach to the study of the consequences of administrative burdens will miss critical heterogeneities that are theoretically grounded in the racialized nature of citizen-state interactions.

In our context, race was particularly salient because of the policy changes that explicitly targeted immigrant groups, but we believe that our findings would extend beyond the case we study and beyond the U.S. context. For example, increasing numbers of immigrants are facing

racial discrimination in policy implementation in not only European countries, but also Asian countries such as Japan and Korea (Guul, Villadsen, and Wulff 2019; Choi and Robinson 2023). We leave it to future research at the intersection of administrative burden and racial equity to test whether the dynamics we uncover also apply in these other contexts outside of the U.S. that also enact and implement racialized burdens.

Our findings also have important implications for scholars and policymakers interested in burden reduction efforts. Understanding the relationship between administrative burden and its direct impact on racially minoritized individuals' trust and civic disposition is an essential next step in public administration literature committed to burden reduction efforts. For policymakers to have direct influence on racially minoritized communities they need to reduce administrative burdens that target these communities the most. Furthermore, integrating multiple avenues for these communities to address concerns, critiques, and comments on government services will not only reduce the prevalence of administrative burdens but also could close the trust gap these groups have towards government. Therefore, as public administration scholars look to improve upon the unequal distribution of resources in government, examining administrative burdens through a holistic lens that includes trust and civic predisposition can help create toolkits for administrators geared at racially minoritized communities.

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# **Data Availability Statement**

The deidentified data underlying this article can be accessed at the Open Science Framework data repository at this link: https://osf.io/92kyw/ DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/92KYW.

